STUDY PROJECT

NAMIBIA: A U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PROPOSAL

BY

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

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On November 6, 1989, elections conducted in Namibia portend the future independence of Africa's "last colony." The independence of Namibia and recent events in South Africa place U.S. foreign policy in Southern Africa at a crossroads. How the United States responds to the needs of the new Namibian government could have significant implications for U.S. relationships in Southern Africa. This study will review Namibia's preparedness for independence and U.S. interests in Namibia. It will recommend a foreign policy for future United States dealings with Namibia.

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NAMIBIA: A U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PROPOSAL

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

NAMIBIA: A U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PROPOSAL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On November 6, 1989, elections were conducted in Namibia. They spelled the end of 74 years of colonialism in Africa; they portended the future independence of Namibia. Significantly, more than 95 percent of Namibia's 700,000 voters turned out for the election. American policy-makers were instrumental in bringing about this long-delayed event. Why? What possible impact could Namibia have on the attainment of U.S. national interests? What would cause the United States to place its international prestige on the line in an attempt to forge a settlement of an issue that has been in limbo since 1978? First, consider Namibia's possible geostrategic location on the western coast of Africa. Then consider the obvious desire of its people for a democratic government. The focus of this paper will be to determine what U.S. foreign policy for Namibia should be within the context of our overall Southern African foreign policy.

Historical Background

This territory entered history under the name of South-West Africa. In 1968 the UN General Assembly changed the name to Namibia in compliance with the wishes of the indigenous African people of the territory. For clarity and consistency, Namibia will be used throughout this paper.

Namibia is a vast territory, about half the size of Alaska. It is bordered by South Africa on the south and southeast, by Botswana on the east, by the Atlantic Ocean on the west, and by Angola on the north. Namibia shares a border with Zambia in the northeast, where the narrow Caprivi Strip between Botswana and Angola extends to the Zambezi River.

With an estimated population of 1,038,000, Namibia is inhabited by several ethnic groups, chiefly the Ovambo, Herero, San (Bushmen), Khoikhoi (Hottentot), Damara, Nama, and Kavango. The remaining 11.6 percent of the population is white.

Namibia was colonized by Germany in 1884, and it remained so until World War I. But in 1920 the League of Nations granted Britain a mandate over Namibia; this mandate was immediately exercised by the Union of South Africa, then a member of the British Commonwealth. The mandate gave administrative and

legislative power to South Africa. The mandate vaguely stated that the administering power must promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the territory. The mandate specifically prohibited annexation of the territory by the administering power.

After the United Nations succeeded the League's supervisory authority in 1946, South Africa refused to place the territory under the International Trusteeship system. South Africa refused to recognize the authority of the UN and announced its intentions to incorporate Namibia when the mandate ended. From then on, Namibia has been administered as though it were a fifth province of South Africa. In 1966, the UN General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate and declared the territory to be the direct responsibility of the UN. In 1971, the International Court of Justice upheld the General Assembly decision and declared that South Africa was obligated to cease its occupation of the territory immediately.[1]

The 1975 intervention of Cuba in Angola altered the balance of power in Southern Africa and forced the United States to increase its involvement in the region. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger started to back away from the Nixonian "straddle the fence" policy of the early 1970's. They sought more active diplomacy with African nations, exerted

stronger .orbal pressure for change in white ruled areas, and increased American involvement in the search for accommodations in Rhodesia and Namibia.[2]

An outgrowth of this enhanced United States involvement in Southern Africa was the "Contact Group" or Western Five, which assumed responsibility for negotiating an agreement for the independence of the territory of Namibia. The five members of the Contact Group (the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada) were major trading and investment partners with South Africa, giving them both potential positive or negative economic leverage. The Contact Group's negotiations were based on Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976: it called for free elections under United Nations supervision and control in a unified Namibia. Further, it urged South Africa to withdraw from its illegal administration of Namibia and specified other measures to transfer power to the people of Namibia. As South Africa continued to ignore the United Nations' authority over Namibia, the Western Contact Group drafted plans for the phased withdrawal of South African troops, the dispatch of a peacekeeping force, a UN administered election (conducted by the South African authorities in Namibia) of a constituent assembly that would lead the country to independence. The Western plan was incorporated into Security Council Resolution (Appendix A) 435 of 1978; this provided the framework for the final negotiated settlement. In 1982, the UN

incorporated a set of constitutional principles into the settlement plan.[7]

Historically, the political environment in Namibia has been dominated by South African attempts to control the society and protect its white minority. With the collapse of Portugal's African Empire in 1974 and the increased diplomatic and military activity by the international community and the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), South Africa has come to realize that its days of direct rule in Namibia were numbered. Pretoria then started to orchestrate an "internal settlement" that would exclude SWAPO and install a pupppet government committed to maintaining its apartheid policies in Namibia. Thus, in September 1975 South Africa organized the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference. From this conference emerged the multiracial Democratic Turnhalle Alliance Party (DTA). The DTA failed to become the standard-bearer South Africa wanted it to be, and the reasons were soon evident. While the DTA was supposed to appeal to all Namibians, its leader was an Afrikaner farmer, Dirk Mudge. The political principle endorsed by DTA was ethnic autonomy, which would essentially maintain the divisions set up by South Africa, leaving white power and privilege largely intact. This was the first major attempt to set up an anti-SWAPO front.

In 1978 South Africa embarked on a "two-track" strategy for dealing with the Namibian issue: it continued to negotiate with the Western Contact group on a settlement, but at the same time it escalated the war with Angola and tried to build up pro-South African political forces in Namibia. This strategy allowed Pretoria to keep its options open. If conditions locally and internationally were favorable, they might pursue a settlement that would keep SWAPO out of power. If not, South Africa would continue its occupation and the war.[4]

South Africa's political leaders share a general conviction that Namibia is the next objective in what they see as the continuing march of international communism through Africa toward the ultimate target: South Africa. To ward off this communist onslaught, it has been intent on making Namibia a de facto, and ultimately a de jure, fifth province of South Africa. Pretoria sees Namibia as a buffer zone against the communist government in Angola; then it has used Namibia as its base area for invasion of Angola and other countries. Namibia has been turned into an armed camp by South Africa: the South African Defense Force (SADF) has launched numerous attacks well into Angola, presumably in pursuit of members of SWAPO and the African National Congress's military wing.[5]

South African political and military leaders fear that a SWAPO-dominated Namibia might invite the Russians and Cubans in, either out of ideological conviction or obligation. Furthermore, they feel that support and sanctuary might be given to African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas operating against the Republic. Namibia could then be used as a springboard for a conventional attack on South Africa.

Why then did South Africa change its policy for dealing with Angola/Namibia? South Africa's new found interest in cooperating in the Angola/Namibia talks originated, above all else, with Cuba's deployment in 1988 o an estimated 15,000 soldiers along the Angola-Namibia border. The deployment shifted the region's strategic balance, causing the South African military deep consternation while fueling the debate within South Africa over the wisdom of costly military adventures hundreds of miles from home. Furthermore, SADF military defeats in Angola at Calueque Dam and Cuito Cuanavale were devasting and caused the Pretoria government to rethink its position. When the Accord was signed, South Africa was estimated to be spending $1 million a day to maintain the South African Defense Force in Angola/Namibia.[6]

Angola's involvement in the Namibian independence process began in 1975. Both the United States and South Africa feared the establishment of a Soviet-backed Marxist government in Angola. Some observers believe that the National Front for the Liberation

of Angola (FNLA) received outside financial support from the United States, which allowed it to re-start its offense against MPLA. This U.S. intervention caused the collapse of the Alvor agreement, resulting in the leader of the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), Agostinho Neto, requesting military assistance from Cuba. In September 1975 Cuba sent troops to Angola to support the MPLA faction after South African forces intervened for the first time in Angola by occupying the Cunene hydroelectric project. U.S. and South African intervent' resulted in major Soviet and Cuban involvement.[7]

The Angolan and Namibian situations became even more tightly interwoven in the early 1980s, when the incoming Reagan administration attempted to link Resolution 435 (Namibian independence) to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, on the grounds that an independent Namibia unprotected by the SADF would be threatened by the Cuban presence. Pretoria seized upon "linkage" as an excuse for further foot-dragging in Namibia's independence.

Nonetheless, in December 1988, as part of the Tripartite Accords brokered by the United States, South Africa finally agreed to the implementation of the U.N. plan in exchange for the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The implementation process began officially on April 1, 1989. The evolutionary

process of Namibian independence clearly has not been dull, and progress toward reaching a settelment has been slow. Both sides have made moves and countermoves to ensure that any settlement would be in their best interests. Throughout these events, South Africa's attitude towards outside intervention and jurisdiction in Namibia has always been aggressive.

ENDNOTES

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2. Chester A. Crocker, "A U.S. Policy for the 90s," Southern Africa, January-February 1989, p.7.

3. Simon Barber, "The View From Washington - US Policy Toward South Africa," in Challenge, ed. by Al J. Venter, pp. 91-106.

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CHAPTER II

CURRENT ISSUES AND NAMIBIA'S FUTURE

Namibia's potential for long-term success as a viable nation is outstanding. The essential elements of a diversified market-oriented economy, political stability, and non-threatening neighbors will all contribute to Namibia's future success. The $36 million debt which Namibia will inherit from South Africa should not create a major problem for the new government; with some outside assistance, it can be easily dealt with.[1] The March 1990 issue of Africa Report indicates that 521 new companies signed up in the first 10 months of 1989 to conduct business in Namibia, once it is independent. Obviously, multinational corporations must have confidence in Namibia's new government and see economic potential. Finally, Namibia's neighbors (Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa) must understand that Namibia's success is in their best interest, and they must cooperate to ensure that success.

Economically, at independence Namibia will possess the infrastructural foundation of roads, telecommunications, banking, and potential port facilities (Walvis Bay) -- all of which are essential to a viable economy. However, the major sectors of the economy, mining and fishing, are dominated by overseas

multinational corporations and South African companies. Additionally, racial differences in education, training, and white collar skills mean that at independence if "white flight" occurs, knowledgeable qualified personnel will not be available to ensure that the economy continues to expand.

Mining is the mainstay of the Namibian economy. It accounts for half of Namibia's GDP and the bulk of its exports; diamonds and uranium are pre-eminent. About 90 percent of the mining industry is controlled by two companies, Consolidated Diamond Mines and Tsumeb Corporation. The large scale exploitation of Namibia's uranium is controlled by Rossing Mine, the largest open cast uranium mine in the world. Currently, all of these companies are operating in violation of UN Decree #1, which prohibits exploitation of Namibian resources because of South Africa's continued illegal rule. Clearly, Namibia's mining sector should be protected and used as a means to finance development in the remainder of the country.[2]

Fishing is Namibia's third most important economic activity, following mining and agriculture. It contributes between 20 and 25 per cent of total export earnings and has provided until quite recently about 7,000 jobs annually. Total fishing-related activities contribute perhaps 10 percent of Namibia's GDP. South Africans own and manage nearly all the fishing industries in

Namibia, as well as the fishing vessels. Exploitation by outsiders almost destroyed Namibia's fishing in the 70s. This industry must also be protected if it is to be available for future Namibian generations.[3]

Perhaps most important for Namibia's future is the possibility of off-shore petroleum fields. In fact, oil was reportedly found some 70 nautical miles from the mouth of the Orange River delta. During the 1970s several oil companies--including Getty, Chevron, Philips and Continental Oil--explored the off-shore area. Additionally, it was recently reported that an important coal field was discovered as a result of off-shore drilling for geological data.[4]

The two leading political parties in Namibia, the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), have stated quite different plans for the economy, if they are in control of the government after independence. SWAPO has stated that it will seek to create a classless society by socializing the means of production, radically redistributing wealth, and thoroughly reorientating the country's external economic and other relations. The DTA, on the other hand, is committed to a free-market economy, the creation of unfettered opport ities for all and the strengthening of ties not only with neigh ng states but also with the West (rather than the Soviet

[illegible]. Regardless of its ideology, the new government will face the same economic issues:

> -the highly uneven distribution of wealth, skills, opportunities and land between whites and the rest of the population;
>
> -the provision of employment as well as improved educational, health and other services for the growing population;
>
> -the social and economic drawbacks of migratory labor;
>
> -the heavy economic dependence on finite mineral assets;
>
> -the problem of establishing manufacturing and processing industries;
>
> -the dualistic economy, i.e the persistence of a traditional economy next to the money economy;
>
> -the issue of agricultural productivity and food supplies;
>
> -economic ties with other countries in Southern Africa, notably South Africa.[3]

The final disposition of Walvis Bay will also have a significant impact on Namibia's future economic stability. Walvis Bay, a 435-square-mile enclave on the Namibian coast, was annexed by the British in 1878 and made part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, which later became South Africa. Though Germany owned the remainder of Namibia until after World War I, it never contested the British claim to the bay area, which is the only developed deep-water port along Namibia's coastline. The only alternative port, Luderitz, is badly situated in the extreme south

of the country; further, it offers little access to the major mining and urban centers to the north. Walvis Bay is therefore crucial for the country's future, since it would provide an independent state of Namibia structural independence from neighboring countries. Currently, though, Walvis Bay is a South African enclave within a nearly independent Namibia. Thus Pretoria can maintain considerable economic and political leverage over Namibia, restricting the country's options for structural independence from South Africa and retarding the process of decolonization in Southern Africa. Walvis Bay provides South Africa with a powerful bargaining card in negotiations with any future government in Namibia; its current status poses a threat to the future independence of the country.[6]

Finally, An independent Namibia will have to choose between membership in the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), led by South Africa, or the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which at present includes Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho. The fact that dual membership is not prohibited will further complicate the decision, since one of SADCC's objectives is to lessen economic dependence on South Africa. Clearly, the future leaders of Namibia will have to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of membership in the two regional agencies.[7]

By virtue of controlling the existing government and policy making apparatus in Namibia, South Africa has been the dominate player in its political process. Historically, Black political involvement in Africa has revolved around ethnic tribes and their headmen; Namibia is no different. This tradition has resulted in Namibia's two other major parties, SWAPO and DTA, contending for the political support of the country's seven tribes.

The South West Africa Peoples Organization had its roots in the Ovambo labor movement of the late 1950s. Founded in Capetown as the Ovambo Peoples Organization (OPO), its initial objective was to bring an end to the contract labor system in South West Africa. Through effective lobbying at the U.N., SWAPO won official recognition by the General Assembly in 1973 as the "sole authentic representative" of the Namibian people, even though a number of other political organizations were active in Namibia at the time. However, South Africa refused to accept SWAPO as the authentic representative of the Namibian people. Pretoria's goal has been to emplace a moderate black political force, such as the DTA, in Namibia that would be both more sympathetic to South African concerns and credible enough to erode the SWAPO vote in any UN-supervised election.[8]

As the November 1989 elections approached, all participants felt that SWAPO would easily obtain the 48 (two-thirds) seats needed to write the new constitution on its own. However, the election results gave SWAPO 41 seats (7 short of what it needed); and the DTA gained 21 seats in the Constituent Assembly. As the majority party, SWAPO now has the task of steering the constitution-drafting process to a successful conclusion and forming a government. Based on the November election returns, the first of these tasks certainly demands a coalition. The second - probably does too.

Recent information from Namibia indicates that the concerns of South Africa about the type of government that SWAPO would establish have been incorrect. Indications are that SWAPO may be on the verge of creating Africa's most liberal democracy. It would appear that SWAPO has sought consensus with its rivals, notably the moderate Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, in line with a policy of national reconciliation proclaimed by SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma. The draft consitution contains the following main points:

> (1)Executive power would be vested in a cabinet headed by the president, who would serve as head of state and government as well as commander of the armed forces.
>
> (2)In articles guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms, the constitution would abolish the death penalty. The draft declares that "the dignity of every person shall be inviolable and no person shall be subject to torture."

(C) Education would be free up to age 16, and no child would be able to leave school before then.

(A) The draft allows for private ownership of property. Expropriation would be permitted only when just compensation is paid.

(E) Apartheid and racial discrimination would be criminally punishable.[8]

If developments continue to evolve as they have to date, Namibia will, could become an example of internal stability and tranquility, as well as a testbed for a multiracial South African society.

Clearly, South Africa is the regional superpower of Southern Africa, given its economic stability and military strength. South Africa's policies on Namibia have been driven by three major concerns: the security of the republic, domestic politics, and the political situation in Namibia. Assuming the trends noted above continue, any potential military threat to South Africa through Namibia will be eliminated. Hopefully these events will result in South Africa adopting a more moderate policy for post-independence interaction with Namibia.

Cuban troops will still be in Angola when Namibia receives its independence in March 1990; however, their threat to Namibia will only be limited. Angola's economy is in total disarray. President dos Santos realizies that only the West is able to assist in restructuring his economy, so he is working diligently

to remove Cuban troops from Angola so that US assistance can be obtained. Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola are meeting the agreement; they are scheduled to be out entirely by 1992. The MPLA government will then reach some accord with the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) and its leader Jonas Savimbi. This will further deminish any threat to Namibia from Angola.

Overall, then, Namibia could enjoy a stable and prosperous beginning as an independent nation. The necessary ingredients are available to allow it to be one of Africa's true success stories, immediately upon independence. A minimal amount of outside assistance could virtually guarantee that success. The United States should make every effort to ensure that it is the nation to which Namibia looks for such assistance.

ENDNOTES

1. Interview with Fred Rindel, Col, Military/Naval Attache, South African Embassy, Washington D.C, 2 March 1990.

2. TransAfrica, Namibia: The Crisis in United States Policy Toward Southern Africa, p.6.

3. Donald L. Sparks, "Namibia's Coastal and Marine Development Potential," African Affairs, 23 July 1980, p. 485.

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5. Dr. G. M. E. Leistner and Theo Malan, "SWA/Namibia: economic survey," Africa Insight, 1981. p. 79.

6. Ronald Dreyer, "Dispute Over Walvis Bay - Origins and Implications for Namibian Independence," African Affairs, October 1984, p. 507.

7. Leistner and Malan, p. 82.

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9. Allister Sparks, "Namibia May Be On Verge Of Creating Africa's Most Liberal Democracy," Washington Post, 11 January 1990, p. A27.

CHAPTER III

U.S. INTERESTS

What U.S. national interest caused it to become enmeshed in the Namibian independence process? Former Vice President Mondale once remarked that, to most Americans, "Namibia" sounded like a new Baskin-Robbins ice cream flavor. As his remark suggests, that emerging nation's problems have remained far from American consciousness. Yet it contains the seeds of a larger conflict--one that would seriously jeopardize United States interests in promoting regional security in the area.[1] I will review U.S. interests in Namibia from the perspective of interrelated categories: geostrategic location, and political and economic stability.

Historically, the geostrategic importance of the entire Southern African region has centered on the issues of critical sea lanes of communication, access to strategic minerals, East/West relations and the region's proximity to major trouble spots in the Middle East. How applicable are these geostrategic considerations to Namibia?

The Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) theory for the Cape of Good Hope and the other littoral nations in the southern region is

based on maritime choke-point potential. Unlike Somalia and its potential for controlling the critical Bab el Mandeb strait, there are no similar choke-points near Namibia. However, Namibia's location is of other potentially strategic significance. Namibia could provide the U.S. with important naval porting and refueling facilities and visiting rights. Similar considerations apply to overflight and air landing privileges. An agreement with Namibia for such privileges would add balance to similar U.S. rights with Indian Ocean littorals.

Namibia's mineral resources-diamonds, gold, copper, lead, zinc, vanadium, and uranium-- do not fall into the U.S. catergories of being either strategic or critical. Unlike its neighbor South Africa, it has no known deposits of either chromium, manganese, or platinum, all of these are either critical or important to U.S. strategic interests. US interest in Namibia's mineral resources are mostly commercial; therefore, they will be discussed as an economic interest.

The probability of East-West confrontation in Southern Africa has diminished, as it has similarly throughout the world. The potential for East-West confrontation by way of Namibia, though possible, is not highly probable. Though the leading contender for political control in Namibia, SWAPO, espoused a Marxist ideology prior to the elections, reality appears to have set in with the

election results. As stated earlier, the SWAPO-led Constituent Assembly has developed a democratic constitution. Angola, which is a potential nemesis, is anxious for Western economic support; therefore, it is unlikely that it will cause any significant problems for Namibia, for fear of antagonizing potential Western supporters.

Political instability is the norm in most of Southern Africa. A stable, pro-Western government in Namibia could serve two important functions for U.S. interest in the region: stability and a model for South Africa for an integrated (non-apartheid) nation. First, as a member of the numerous forums operating in the region, Namibia could exert a postive pro-Western influence. Traditionally, the African nations, as a block, have not voted with the United States in international forums. Though only one vote, it could add to the U.S. voting strength in the United Nations. Based on its outstanding participation in negotiating the RSA/Angola/Namibia settlement the US is in an excellent position to benefit if the government is pro-Western.

Second, possibly the most important factor given recent events in South Africa, the new nation of Namibia could demonstrate for the South African populace that a multiracial society can co-exist and that a Black-led nation can have a viable economy and protect all citizens' rights. Thus Namibia

could add to the stability of the entire southern African region.

A successful Namibia would be advantageous to U.S. interests in democracy, regional stability, economic reform, and the elimination of apartheid in Southern Africa. All of these interests are interdependent. It has been proven that without a viable economy, the potential for political stability is questionable. Therefore, Namibia must not join the African debt cycle. African debt service obligations have grown to such excessive levels that hardly any balance remains to support financial growth and development.[2] Participation in the Namibian economy by the United States and other Western multinational cooperations would add diversity to its economy and break the chain of reliance on South Africa. U.S. oil companies have previously conducted business in Namibia and should be encouraged to reestablish those ties. Excellent opportunities exist in the petroleum arena. Further, even though Namibia's mineral resources are not critical to U.S. defense needs, they do have commercial significance.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy, p. [illegible].

2. Al[illegible] F[illegible], "Breaking the Debt Cycle," New African, June 1987, p. [illegible].

CHAPTER IV

UNITED STATES POLICY FOR NAMIBIA

U.S. foreign policy for dealing with Southern Africa is at a crossroads. The pending independence of Namibia and recent events in South Africa have presented the United States with a great opportunity for improving its relationships in the region. The following recommendations for how the United States should proceed in developing its relationship with Namibia are based on current U.S. policy goals for Southern Africa.

--Promote a pro-Western political and economic orientation in African countries, encouraging them to adopt pluralistic economic and political systems:

The Namibian people and their Constituent Assembly have indicated a desire for a pluralistic political system and an open market-economy. The United States should develop a comprehensive plan to promote democracy and economic development in Namibia. That plan must ensure that Namibia does not become a victim to Africa's debt crisis. This can best be accomplished by working closely with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Economic Commission for Africa to make the maximum funds possible available for development and restructuring. The resolution of the Walvis Bay issue in Namibia's favor will go far

toward ensuring Namibia's economic future. Furthermore, since Walvis Bay has excellent facilities, SADCC transportion projects could be tied to Namibia. Namibia's close cooperation with the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in building a transportation infrastructure is important to the future development of an economically independent black Southern Africa.

Long-term debt owed the U.S. government by sub-Saharan Africa totalled $3.2 billion at the end of 1987.[1] The United States should join its Western allies and participate in a debt forgiveness program. African debt has grown so large that the current debt rescheduling program is proving ineffective. African nations are struggling to meet rescheduled interest payments. Canada, Holland and Scandinavia have cancelled most debt owed to them, and Britain and France have made partial cancellations. The debt burden ($36 million) which South Africa will turn over to Namibia should be forgiven. This will solve two problems: First, it will relieve the burden from the new government; second, it will be construed as a concession to South Africa, thereby, providing a positive conciliatory gesture.

--Goal: the abolition of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa through a process of negotiation:

Apartheid has existed in Namibia since 1948, and it is as entrenched there as it is in the Republic of South Africa. If the coalition government can work there, it can serve as an excellent example to South Africa. The United States should adopt a policy that clearly aligns it against apartheid and with the Frontline states of Southern Africa. Previously, the U.S. apartheid policy has been essentially rhetorical, but its actions have not always supported that policy. An opportunity exists in Namibia to make a statement and possibly to forstall civil war in South Africa. This will be possible only if the Namibian coalition government is successful.

Namibia has been subjected to international sanctions and divestment policies by virtue of its links to South Africa. Though their impact on events in Namibia can not be measured, they can not be discounted either. Several nations have already lifted sanctions against Namibia based on its pending independence. The U.S. should lift sanctions against Namibia, but continue to use them as leverage to expedite negotiations between the African National Congress and the South African government. They work, but they must be applied judiciously. They should be lifted as serious negotiations--which can be defined as lifting the Group Areas Act, the Land Act, or the Population Registration Act--proceed.

--Facilitate peaceful resolution of African disputes, including a successful transition to independence in Namibia and national reconciliation in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia:

The U.S. effort in this area was solidified when it facilitated the RSA/Angolan/Namibian settlement process. The U.S. should focus on building on this outstanding effort by remaining involved, where possible, in resolving other such disputes. Though Namibia will face only a limited insurgency problem from Angola, the US should provide security assistance and training programs to Namibia to support its efforts in deterring border violations. The United States could leverage its position with Angola and ensure it honors Namibia's borders by accommodating Angolan desires for economic assistance. Additionally, aid to UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimibi should be terminated to add stability to Angola's internal situation. Likewise the potential military threat from the Republic of South Africa should diminish.

--Encourage mutually advantageous economic relations and foster conditions in Africa favorable to such relations, including the adoption of market-oriented economic reforms:

Prior to the November election, Sam Nujoma, who is expected to be the first president of Namibia, indicated he would nationalize the country's major industries.[2] However, the proposed constitution developed by the Constituent Assembly allows for private ownership of property and an open economy. Furthermore,

prior to the elections SWAPO was working closely with DeBeers, a multinational mining corporation in Namibia, dispelling the probability of nationalization.

A market-oriented economy would enhance the probability of success in Namibia. The possibility of "white flight" would thus greatly decrease, meaning that trained white-collar workers and private business owners would not depart, taking their skills and financial assets with them. This would add stability to Namibia and enhance the probability of multinational businesses investing in the country.

--Deny strategic advantage and influence to countries and groups with objectives opposed to our own; preserve and improve our access to facilities of strategic interest:

To prevent foreign intervention in Namibia, the United States should negotiate access rights for naval porting and refueling, as well as airfield landing and access privileges. This would serve to deny similar access to the Soviets and their surrogates. The indicated access and facility rights would allow for a limited U.S. presence in Namibia that would discourage outside intervention and would also assist in stimulating the Namibian economy. Also, the feasibility of establishing listening and surveillance facilities in Namibia should be researched.

The US African Coastal Security (ACS) program has been essential to increased US influence in several countries with Soviet ties. ACS helps selected littoral states improve their control over their coastal waters and maritime resources. Namibia could use ACS support to secure its coastal waters and to protect its long-abused fishing resources.

--Obtain greater African support for U.S. positions in international fora, especially the U.N.:

Africa holds a sizable bloc of votes (50) in the United Nations. These nations also participate in numerous other world forums in which the United States is involved. Historically, the African nations vote as a block, traditionally against U.S. positions. Though only one vote, if Namibia could be encouraged to support U.S. initiatives in these forums it could serve as a positive influence. The United States should use consistent foreign assistance to encourage this support. Other African nations observing the consistency of this support might chose to break away from the African anti-U.S. voting bloc.

--Assist in the alleviation of suffering caused by famine, disease and natural disasters:

Namibia's small population should allow it to continue to be agriculturally self-sufficient. However, United States-funded agencies should provide agricultural extension services to Namibia

where required. Technical assistance, training, and credit should be extended to farmers; land reform should be encouraged to redistribute land ownership. Today, 80 percent of the farmable land is in white hands, in accord with apartheid laws.

--Strengthen respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of constitutional law throughout Africa:

The United States should be consistent in condemning violations of basic human rights. Prior to and since the settlement, human rights atrocities have been committed by both SWAPO and the South African supported government in Namibia. Since the majority of all human rights violations in Namibia were committed by soldiers (PLAN/SADF), decisions on the composition of the Namibian defense/police forces should focus on alleviating problems in this area.[3] The U.S. Military Education and Training (IMET) Program should be used to train Namibian military leaders not only in military skills but also on how the military should support the government and observe human rights. Observance of human rights should be directly tied to US economic and security assistance.

In summary, U.S. foreign policy options in Southern Africa are at a crossroads. Namibia's pending independence now presents United States foreign policy developers with a unique opportunity. United States' interests in Africa, particularly in Southern Africa, are varied and extensive. From colonial days, independent

Southern Africa has been integrated with the West along economic, political, and cultural axes. Thus the region has looked chiefly, if not solely, to the West for development and security, for assistance in pressuring South Africa, and for collective undertakings. By making the correct policy decisions in dealing with Namibia, the United States will contribute to easing the region's crisis while also assuring that it shares in the future development of the area's substantial economic potential. In short, U.S. interests will be much better served in the future by a foreign policy that integrates regional with strategic considerations, aligns U.S. policy with that of the other Western powers, logically connects abhorrence of apartheid with concern for the surrounding region, and avoids simplistic East-West stereotypes.

ENDNOTES

1. Carol Lancaster and Sergei Shatalov, "A Joint Approach To Africa's Debt," Africa Report, May-June 1989, p. 44.

2. Allister Sparks, "Spotlight Cast on Abilities of Namibia's Likely Future President," Washington Post, 21 September 1989, A22.

3. Mark Vertaan, "Peace on Pretoria's Terms?," Africa Report, May-June 1989, p. 15.

UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) of 30th January, 1976, and 431 (1978) and 432 (1978) of 27th July 1978, (p 4938),

Having considered the report of Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29th September, 1978, (pp 4969, 4999),

Taking note of the relevant communications from the government of South Africa to the Secretary-General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8th September, 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization to the Secretary-General,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

1 Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation and his explanatory statement;

2 Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the People of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976);

3 Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition assistance group in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his special representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;

4 Welcomes the preparedness of the South West African People's Organization to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the ceasefire provisions as manifested in the letter from its president of 8th September, 1978;

5 Calls upon South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

6 Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and the present resolution, are null and void;

7 Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council not later than 23rd October, 1978 on the implementation of the present resolution.

The resolution was proposed by Canada, France, Gabon, West Germany, Mauritius, Nigeria, United Kingdom and United States.

It was adopted on 29th September 1978 by 12 votes to 0, with the USSR and Czechoslovakia abstaining and China not participating, and has since then served as the basis for the Western Contact Group's negotiations.

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